To state that language and nationalism are closely related is a tautology, but one that needs restating in view of the loose usage of the term "nationalism" in the Third World and particularly in the African literature. In the 19th century European sense of the word,"nationalism" referred to a political movement or a process of growing self-consciousness based on a feeling of common ethnicity. Of the several criteria of ethnicity, a common language has often been the paramount one with religion coming in second place. Thus, when one speaks of German or Italian nationalism, one means primarily the growth of political consciousness by people sharing the same language.
2
In conclusion, I would suggest that "tribe" and its derivatives be scrapped altogether. To refer to a political movement based on ethnicity, I shall use the term "nationalism" (e.g. "Yoruba nationalism," "Ewe nationalism," "Kikuyu nationalism").
To refer to political movements that use the multi-national state as their defining unit, I shall speak of "territorialism" (e.g. "Nigerian territorialism," "Congolese territorialism"), Only in the few cases of true African nation-states, i.e. in the few instances of culturally homogeneous or nearly homogeneous states, can the term "nationalism" properly be applied at the level of the sovereign polity (e.g. Somali nationalism, Egyptian nationalism or Rwanda nationalism), Finally, where the defining unit is larger than both the sovere:icistate and the ethnic gr. oup, I shall speak of "internationalism" (e.g. European internationalism, African internationalism, PanIslamic internationalisn). However. movements aimed at uniting in a single state ethnic groups divided between several poli.;:ies are properly "nationalist" (e 0g.
Bakongo nationalism, German nationalism prior to Bismarck).
Having hopefully given back to the term nationalism the reasonably clear meaning it had until my Africanist colleagues confused the issue, I shall turn to an analysis of the political role of language in the Republic of South Africa.2 According to the above definitions, there is no political movement in contemporary South Africa which can properly be called "nationalist," although I confess to having loosely used the term in my previous writings about South Africa, Whatever nationalism existed among the African nation-states of the 19th century (the Zulu, the Xhosa, the Sotho, the Swazi, the Ndebele) has all but disappeared by now. Although the indigenous languages are spoken by more people than ever before, and although feelings of ethnic particularism and prejudice persist between African ethnic groups, these feelings have little if any political meaning in the modern context. (They are analogous to ethnic feelings of people of Italian, Irish or Jewish descent in the United States for example.) Mat is often called "African nationalism or "black nationalism" in South Africa is the movement aiming at the overthrow of white supremacy, and represented by such orgauizations as the Pan African the Congress and/African National Congress. In our terminology, this is an instance of territorialism. Similarly, "white nationalism" is simply a racist ideology for the maintenance of the status glia.
Of course, some scholars would argue that "Afrikaner nationalism," i.e. the political movement of people of Dutch or Boer descent, is an authentic case of nationalism as I have defined it. 3 Afrikaner nationalism does indeed have many characteristics of classical nationalism, and, of all political movements in South Africa, comes closest to being truly nationalist. Yet, the added element of racism complicates the picture. Speaking Afrikaans as one's mother tongue is a necessary condition for membership in the Volk. But it is not a sufficient condition; one must also meet the test of racial "purity." For every six "white" people who are ethnically Afrikaners, there are five "Coloured" Afrikaners who are denied membership into the yolk. That race is an even more important criterion than ethnicity is shown by the fact that, de just, a non-Afrikaans-speaking white may belong to the governing Nationalist Party (and de facto quite a number of German-and a few English-speaking whites do belong to the Party), whereas an Afrikaans-speaking coloured may not.
While there is a strong ethnic component to "Afrikaner nationalism" (probably over 95 percent of the Nationalist Party members are Afrikaans-speaking) , that movement is first and foremost racial and only secondarily nationalist. Yet, the Afrikaners, of any ethnic group in South Africa, have come closest to developing a nationalist movement.
Although no South African political movement is, strictly speaking, nationalist, ethnicity has been, next to race, the most important line of cleavage in South African society. More specifically, the English-Afrikaner conflict which goes back to the first years of the nineteenth century has an important linguistic dimension, and the 1* official status and use of the two main European languages has lenE been a football of white politics.
Here I should like to deal briefly with four main aspects of the political significance of language in contemporary South Africa: 1) traditional Afrikaner "nationalism";
2) the reaction of other ethnic and racial groups to Afrikaner nationalism; 3) the use of ethnic revivalism and the attempt to revive African linguistic nationalism in the apartheid program of the government; 4) problems presented by multi-lingualism in the future development of South Africa as a unicary state under majority control. Afrikaner nationalism is distinctly unlike most political movements of independence and anti-colonialism in black,4frical and is especially different from the so-called
African nationalism within South Africa ite3f.
2)
It might be expected that militant Afrikaner nationalism would have elicited other similar movements among the other main ethnic and racial groups in South Africa,
In fact, for diverse reasons, this has not been the case to any significant extent.
Of the three main non-white racial groups, the Coloureds have been most completely westernized, and have most aspired to social assimilation intothe dominant white group0. Although long frustrated in their assimilationist aspirations, most Coloureds, far from wanting to maintain a separate identity, continue to seek acceptance into the two main white ethnic groups whose culture they share, Indians have been divided into two main religious groups) five language groups) and many more caste groups, any of which would be far too small to constitute a basis for a politically successful nationalist movement. Furthermore, South African
Indians have been rapidly anglicized, and although they do not, by and large, seek assimilation to the whites, they do seek equal, non-discriminatory acceptance into a multi-racial and multi-ethnic South Africa. Since the days of Mahatma Gandhi, South African Indian politics have been secular, universalistic, and opposed to any ethnic or racial divisions. Thus, the only group in South Africa (and one of the few in the sub-Saharan part of the continent) to have developed a nationalism based, at least partly, on ethniqty and language are the Afrikaners. We shall now turn to the implications of that fact for apartheid policy toward the other ethnic groups in South Africa.
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3) The attempt by the ruling Afrikaner nationalists to impose upon the other groups a policy of rigid racial and ethnic separation is the result of complex motivations. It is partly a systematic method of dividing Africans, some two-thirds of whom have now become."detribalized," into mutually antagonistic ethnic groups. To the extent that Africans of various language groups have intermixed, intermarried, learned each other's tongues; and ltved and worked side by side in the cities under identical conditions of oppression and destitution, they have developed a common consciousness which transcends ethnicity. The government policy of "retribalization" is in part a conscious effort to counteract these universalistic trends, and to isolate each ethnic group in a cultural and political desert.
Beyond this rather obvious motive, Pretoria-sponsored cultural revivalism for Africans arises from a confusion between race and culture on the part of the ruling Afrikaners. In spite of considerable contrary evidence in their own country, most South African whites believe that culture ib in part racially determined, and, hence, that a given culture reflects the innate abilities and propensities of its members, Consequently, the alledgedly "primitive" Bantu cultures are held to be peculiarly suited to the supposedly "primitive" mentality of Africans.
A third source of cultural revivalism arises from the projection of the Afrikaner's sense of ethnic particularism and linguistic chauvinism onto other people.
Since the preservation of ethnic and racial identity has been a paramount value in Afrikaner nationalism, many Afrikaners have assumed that other ethnic groups would feel likewise.
Pretoria-sponsored revivalism vis as!' vis Africans is reflected in a number of apartheid programs. In urban areas, an attempt is made to segregate Africans of different language groups from each other, as well as Africans from non-Africans.
In the rural areas, the Bantustan policy consists of consolidating and reconstructing mono-ethnic areas with a semi-autonomous political structure modeled in part on traditional chieftainship. Such insignificant voting rights as Africans enjoy are based on ethnicity. E.g. in the Transkei, Xhosa-speaking people vote for Xhosa candidates to the Xhosa Assembly.
Similarly, the entire educational system for Africans has been "tribalizedfl-by the Bantu Education Department. Mothertongue instruction is stressed at all levels of schooling despite overwhelming opposition of Africans who would prefer to be taught in English, at least beyond the lower primary grades. Ethnically segregated pseudo universities have been created for the Zulu, Xhosa and Sotto, and these bush college0 are practically the only places where Africans of a given language group can receive any form of post-secondary education. In these institutions, attempts are made to use Bantu languages as media of instruction, to modify the curriculum in line with Pretoria's conception what is good for Africans, to create an artificial technical vocabulary in the Bantu languages, to incorporate Bantu elements into the architecture, and to instill ethnic chauvinism into the students. 6
4)
The significance of language in South African politics is of course not limited to the past and present. Assuming that the status suo is unlikely to continue for much longer, and that South Africa will continue to exist as a unitary state but under a government representing the majority of the people, the use of official languages will have immediate educational and political implications.
Obviously, the present situation where only the two main European languages are granted official status is unlikely to be acceptable to most South Africans under a majority government. Many Africans have developed negative feelings toward Afrikaans as the language of the oppressors. But, as the home language of well over three million people, nearly half of whom are non-whites, Afrikaans can not easily be eliminated.
Most educated Africans, who are likely to play prominent roles in the future, would probably be reluctant to substitute a Bantu language as the official tongue. Second, any satisfactory solution of linguistic problems will have to take both "non- Clearly, South Africa offers fascinating prospects for both theoretical and applied sociolinguistics; and, equally clearly, sociolinguistics will have to assign to each set of factors its proper weight in the tote. equation. For such an embryonic discipline, the difficulty will be as great as the opportunity. 
